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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
The Appellee is Chrysler Credit Corporation, acting through its successor-ininterest Chrysler Financial Company, LLC. Appellee is represented by P.Bryan
Fishburn, Esq., FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. and by Gary R. Howe, Esq.,
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH. Neither of the above counsel
represent Chrysler Motor Corporation on the appeal, nor have they ever represented
Chrysler Motor Corporation as Appellant asserts in his Brief at 2. Chrysler Motor
Corporation was not served after the appellant Adrian Niculescu filed his Complaint
twelve years ago, in 1989. Chrysler Motor Corporation did not enter an appearance
below and is not a party to this appeal.
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43

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
(1)

Response to Appellant's Statement

A.

Appellant claims that he should have had the benefit of a more lenient

standard of proof, as the result of an amendment to federal law after he filed his
Complaint. A statute, as a general rule, cannot be applied retroactively to determine
liability. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. An issue, also, is preserved for appeal only if the
issue was presented to the Trial Court and that court given the opportunity to consider
it. Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah 1991). The argument
that Appellant now makes was not made to the Trial Court.
B.

Appellant claims that the Court erred in not entering a default judgment

against Chrysler Credit Corporation, the sanction he sought for what he perceived to
be a chronic failure to respond to his discovery. A trial court has broad discretion in
selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. Appellate review is limited
to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Preston & Chambers, P.C.
v. Roller. 943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 1997).
C.

Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in finding that Chrysler

Credit Corporation's 1987 report of a repossession was not the product of malice or an
intent to injure Mr. Niculescu. Findings of Fact may be reversed on appeal only if the
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appellant can demonstrate they were clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ. P. 52(a);
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). An appellant who
fails to first marshall those facts that would tend to support a trial court's findings
cannot prove the findings to have been clearly erroneous. Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989).
D.

Appellant claims that the Trial Court erred in denying his post trial

Motion for Relief, founded on Rule 60(b). A trial court's denial of a motion premised
on Rule 60(b), Utah R.Civ.P., will not be disturbed or overruled absent an abuse of
discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).
(2)

Governing Law on Liability

The liability of Chrysler Credit Corporation in this case is governed by 15
U.S.C. §1681h(e). This statute preempts state common law claims for negligence
when the context is reporting credit performance information to a consumer reporting
agency. For Chrysler Credit Corporation to be liable to Niculescu based on its 1987
report of a repossession, Niculescu must have proved that Chrysler Credit Corporation
reported false information AND that its report was the product of malice or a willful
intent to injure him. Id. Otherwise, it is immune.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from Third District Court, Civil No.89090611CV (Judges
Leonard Russon, Anne Stirba1, Stephen Henriod, D.K. Cornaby, Bruce Lubeck).
Mr. Niculescu filed this action against Chrysler Credit Corporation (hereafter
"CCC") in 1989. Record ("R") at 1. The case was settled and dismissed with
prejudice in 1992. Order of Dismissal, R.121 (Stirba, J). CCC paid Niculescu $1,500
and agreed to amend and withdraw its earlier report of a repossession. R. 130-132.
After a lapse of five years, Niculescu became convinced (CCC believes
incorrectly) that CCC had not performed its promises under the Settlement
Agreement. In electing his remedy, Niculescu (represented by counsel) in 1997 paid
into Court the $1,500 he had received from CCC in 1992 and moved to set aside the
prior Order of Dismissal. R. 124. His motion also prayed that the prior settlement
agreement be set aside. IcL The subsequent Order entered November 12, 1997, R.
139, set aside the settlement and Order of Dismissal, and resurrected Niculescu's 1989
Complaint. At this juncture, CCC's alleged nonperformance of the 1992 settlement
agreement became irrelevant and immaterial.
On August 31, 1999, Niculescu moved to compel responses to Interrogatories,
Document Requests, and Requests for Admission that he had earlier served on CCC.
R.201. The Court granted the motion and ordered CCC to respond on or before

!

The case was assigned to Judge Stirba as early as September 1991. However, the
case was tried before Judge Cornaby because of Judge Stirba's ill health.
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October 8, 1999, with sanctions possibly to follow if it did not. R.217. CCC timely
and fully complied with this Order, serving its responses on Niculescu by October 8,
1999, as ordered. R.219, 254-270. The Court later confirmed that CCC had
complied. R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto).
On October 27, 1999, CCC moved to dismiss certain of Niculescu's causes of
action. The motion was granted by Order entered December 27, 1999. R.295-2992.
The effect of this Order was to dismiss Niculescu's second and fourth causes of
action, as well as most of the first identified in his 1989 Complaint. Remaining was
Niculescu's third cause of action which he characterized as "intentional and malicious
destruction of credit rating." The surviving parts of his first cause of action, Le. those
comprised by paragraphs 3-4, 7-8, and 15, stated a similar claim predicated on the
alleged "false" report of a repossession by CCC to a consumer reporting agency. The
residue of Claim I stated a claim for negligent, as well as an intentional reporting of
false information to a consumer reporting agency.
On November 9, 1999, Niculescu filed a second motion to compel. R.249.
CCC opposed this motion. R.282-285. Niculescu did not notice up this motion for
decision. See R.518, 519 (Exhibit "C" hereto).
On January 27, 2000, Niculescu served on CCC Requests for Admission. The
Requests were served by mail. R.359-362. CCC responded thirty-two days later.
2

The motion and parties' memoranda on CCC's motion to dismiss are found at
R.223-248, 271-278. In his Brief at 6, Appellant incorrectly refers to this as a
motion for summary judgment.
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R.363, 364, 372-379. Exhibit "B" hereto. As the Court later concluded, these
responses were timely. R.518, 519 (Exhibit "C" hereto).
On March 22, 2000, Niculescu filed a "Motion for Sanctions and to Enter
Default." R. 365-400. He asked the Court to enter a default judgment against CCC
for what he perceived to be a chronic failure to respond to his discovery. R.365. CCC
opposed this motion. R.401-450. The judge found Niculescu's arguments to be
without merit, R.518-521, and his motion for sanctions was denied, R.518 (Exhibit
"C" hereto), 528.
On April 11, 2000, CCC moved for leave to amend its original Answer. R.454.
Its purpose in doing so was to plead as an affirmative defense a qualified immunity
based on 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e), a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.3 A copy
of this Section is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". The Court granted CCC leave to
amend. R. 735, 748. CCC's amended Answer is found at R. 741.
On August 2, 2000, CCC moved for summary judgment. R.576. Niculescu
opposed the motion and it was denied. R.735, 738.
Prior to trial, the Court also ordered that the $1,500 that Niculescu had paid
into Court as a condition to setting aside the earlier settlement and dismissal, be
released and returned to CCC. R.748.

3

The memoranda in support of and in opposition to this motion are found at R.
464-468, 503-506, 507-511. Although Niculescu opposed CCC's motion to
amend, he now claims, ironically, that he pleaded a cause of action based on 15
U.S.C. § 1681 in his 1989 complaint. Brief at 5.
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Both parties filed Trial Briefs: CCC at R.765-801; Niculescu at R.849-853.
Both submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, consistent with
what each believed would be proven: CCC at R.839-848; Niculescu at R.762-764.
Trial comprised two days, February 12-13, 2001. The case was tried to the
bench, K.S. Cornaby presiding. Following the close of the evidence, Judge Cornaby
ruled in favor of the defendant, Chrysler Credit Corp. Judge Cornaby explained his
reasoning on the record. Transcript of Ruling. He also provided to CCC's counsel a
copy of CCC's pre-trial proposed findings and conclusions which he had edited.
R.839-848. He instructed CCC to make the changes he had directed and then
resubmit them for signature and entry. Transcript of Ruling at 8.
CCC made the changes and then on February 15, 2001 served on Niculescu the
edited, still proposed Findings of Fact. R. 871. Niculescu did not object to the form
of the proposed Findings within the time permitted by Rule 4-504, Utah Code Judic.
Admin. He belatedly filed objections on March 8, 2001.
The Findings and Conclusions were entered by the Court on March 11, 2001
(Cornaby, J.). R. 862. None of Niculescu's objections were heeded. The Trial Court
found, as fact, that Niculescu defaulted on his payment obligations under the retail
installment contract assigned to CCC, see_ Findings 4, 11-13; that CCC in the ordinary
course of business repossessed and sold the collateral that secured Niculescu's
contractual obligations to CCC, Findings 13, 15-19; and that the reported
repossession, in any event, was not with malice or the product of a willful intent to
-14-

harm Niculescu, Findings 20-23, 24-26. R.862-866. The Court concluded, among
other things, that: Niculescu breached his contractual payment obligations to CCC
(Conclusions of Law Nos. 1-2); that CCC, on Niculescu's default, was legally entitled
to repossess and sell Niculescu's van (Conclusions Nos. 4-5); that CCC's 1987 report
of a repossession was accurate (Conclusion No. 6); that Niculescu's claim against
CCC was governed by 15 U.S.C. 1681h(e) (Conclusion No. 7); that Niculescu, in any
event, had not proven that CCC's report was with malice or with intent to injure
Niculescu (Conclusion No. 8); and that CCC was not liable to Niculescu (Conclusion
14), R.862, 867-870. The Trial Court also was not persuaded that the damages about
which Niculescu complained were proximately caused by the 1987 credit report of a
repossession. Finding 28, R. 862, 867. In sum, and based on an analysis of the facts
within the qualified immunity framework provided by federal law, the Trial Court
held that CCC was not liable for the damages that Niculescu claimed were caused by
CCC's allegedly false report of a repossession. A copy of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Exhibit MA".
Judgment was entered a few days later, on March 28, 2001. R. 883. The
Judgment (Cornaby, J.) dismissed with prejudice the remainder of Niculescu's claims
and causes of action. The ten days after judgment saw no motions to amend findings
of fact, conclusions of law, or the judgment itself. See, Utah Rules Civ. P.52(b), 59.
Twenty-seven days after the judgment was entered, however, Niculescu filed what he
called a "Motion for Relief." R.886. Ostensibly founded on Rule 60(b), the motion
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asked the Court to amend and add to the Findings of Fact it had entered on March 11,
2001. CCC opposed the motion, R.894-898, and it was denied, R. 909 (Lubeck, J.).
Niculescu initiated this appeal by Notice filed with the Third Judicial District
Court on April 26, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1987, Niculescu purchased from Hinckley Dodge a new Dodge B150
Van to use and operate as a taxi. CCC extended Niculescu the credit he needed in
order to consummate his purchase. The Retail Installment Contract that Niculescu
signed on March 11, 1987, which was assigned by Hinckley to CCC for value4,
obligated Niculescu to pay CCC $24,861.60 (the total purchase price plus interest) in
sixty (60) monthly installments of $414.36. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1. Niculescu ,
a lawyer in Romania before he emigrated to the United States, understood that he was
contractually obliged to repay the loan. Trial Transcript ("T") at 78-79. Niculescu
gave CCC a security interest in the van to secure his repayment obligations.
Defendant's Trial Exh. 1. Niculescu made no payments on his loan. T. 80, 247.
Shortly after his purchase, Niculescu claimed he experienced an oil leak and
other mechanical problems. He asked Hinckley to make repairs, but its service
department allegedly was unresponsive. Niculescu says he tried to persuade Chrysler
Motor Company to honor its warranty, but that it too, was unresponsive.

4

CCC purchased the installment sale contract on delivery of a check to Hinckleys
equal to the purchase price for the vehicle. T. 188-190, 247.
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Having driven the van over 5,000 miles and earned $2,000 using it as a taxi for
three weeks, Niculescu unilaterally returned the van to Hinckley. T. 87-88;
Defendant's Trial Exh. 6, p.2; Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 27.
About May 19, 1987, CCC's Bountiful office discovered that Niculescu had
left the van with Hinckley and declared that he intended not to repay his loan. T.4142, 87-88, 165. Niculescu in fact never repaid any of the money he borrowed to
purchase the van. T.80, 247. CCC picked up the van and took possession. It mailed
to Niculescu a written notice disclosing (1) its possession of the vehicle and (2) its
intent to sell it on or after May 29, 1987. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 2. The Notice
stated the amount owed, $18,236.07, and advised Niculescu of his right to redeem the
vehicle. Niculescu did not respond to this letter. T.128, 253-254. On June 29, 1987,
CCC's Arleen Bedingfield mailed Niculescu a Deficiency Notice, which indicated
that $6,036.07 remained owing on his account after the sale of his van. Defendant's
Trial Exh. 3. The letter invited Niculescu to contact CCC to work out a payment
schedule and "reestablish [his] good credit rating." Again, Niculescu did not respond.
T. 128, 254-256. In the course of this process, in the regular course of its business,
CCC reported a repossession. T.191, 263. The report was accurate.
Niculescu, represented by counsel, filed suit against Chrysler Motor
Corporation in United States District Court (Sam, J.) on September 1, 1987.
Defendant's Trial Exh. 5. He asserted causes of action based on breach of warranty,
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and negligent manufacture. Jd- He
-17-

alleged damages in the amount of $250,000; the same quantum of damages,
incidentally, that he alleged in this case (which in this case he alleges resulted from a
negative report by CCC concerning his credit). He did not ask to rescind his
purchase.5 He did not join CCC as a defendant. T.l 19. There was no adjudication of
the warranty and related claims as the lawsuit was settled.6 The case based on vehicle
defects, thus, was settled on Niculescu's receipt of a sum of money.7

That settlement

resulted in the release of all claims by Niculescu against Chrysler Motor Corporation
and the dealer that sold him the van, Hinckley Dodge. See Defendant's Trial Exh. 6,
p.6.
After Niculescu's quest for $250,000 damages against Chrysler Motor
Corporation failed, he turned on Chrysler Credit Corporation.
Prior to trial, and at trial in this case, Niculescu complained that CCC's 1987
report of a repossession had ruined his life and destroyed his business. He claimed it
had caused the denial of vehicle loans in 1987 and 1989. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 24,

5

Niculescu might have sought to rescind under Utah's "lemon law" statute, which
applies to new vehicles, Utah Code Ann. § 13-20-1 et seq. He might also have
rejected the vehicle, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602, or revoked acceptance, id_ §
70A-2-606, 608.
6

Judge Sam, however, in a Ruling dated January 26, 1990 observed that
"[Niculescu] admitted he had no evidence to show Chrysler carelessly and
negligently manufactured the van." Defendant's Trial Exh. 6, p.2.
7

Niculescu tried to renege on this settlement and took an appeal versus Chrysler
Motor Coiporation to the Tenth Circuit before the dispute was finally concluded.
Niculescu's appeal was denied. Niculescu v. Chrysler Motors Corporation (10th
Cir., Case No. 90-4018).
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25; also received as Defendant's Trial Exhibits 8 and 9. He claimed he could not
thereafter borrow from major banks; that he was forced to pay 525% annual interest
on borrowed funds. He claimed he could not readily obtain credit. According to
Niculescu, the 1987 report of a repossession had a "snowball effect" with adverse
credit effects up to the present time. According to Niculescu, " . . . all the problem I
got for ten years because of repossession I guess still and increase every day." T. 129.
Niculescu offered as exhibits denials of credit dated 1997 by First Card, Plaintiffs
Trial Exh. 27; by Murdock Chevrolet, Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 28; and by Bank of
America, Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 29. According to Niculescu, these exhibits proved the
direct and everlasting impact caused by the 1987 report of a repossession.
Niculescu's perception of "facts" and his selective recounting of them to this
Court, however, do not coincide with the whole of the evidence that the Trial Court
received. CCC's report of a repossession, or voluntary surrender,8 first, could have at
most continued to be reported only seven years after the date of first report. T.178; 15
U.S.C. § 1681c. The 1987 denial of credit by Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. was
because Niculescu had inadequate income, not because of a reported repossession by
CCC. "Derogatory credit information" was not checked as a reason for credit denial.
Plaintiffs Trial Exh. 26. The 1989 denial of credit by GMAC did list a reported

8

According to CCC, it reported a voluntary surrender rather than a repossession.
T.193, 196, 249-250. However, these events are both coded as an "1-8" in reports
to consumer reporting agencies. T.161-162. CCC conceded that the difference in
reporting a voluntary surrender and a repossession is insignificant. T.218, 249250.
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repossession as a reason for credit denial, but it was only one of four reasons.
Plaintiff's Trial Exh. 24. Niculescu had a second repossession subsequent to 1987,
which undoubtedly impaired his credit and which was revealed only on crossexamination. T. 106-107.
The 1997 denials of credit could not have been based on the 1987 report,
because reports of negative credit performance drop off after 7 years. In fact, a 1996
TRW credit bureau report for Niculescu obtained by CCC in the course of discovery
no longer showed the 1987 CCC report of repossession. Defendant's Trial Exh. 14;
see also Defendant's Trial Exh. 31. When pressed, Niculescu "guessed" that the 1997
credit denials were "because too many bills and not enough income." T.l 12. CCC,
furthermore, deleted the report of the repossession by no later than November 1993
(pursuant to the settlement agreement that Niculescu later rescinded). Defendant's
Trial Exh. 4, T.182-183,193-197.
Contrary to Niculescu's initial testimony, major banks did extend him credit:
Zions Bank (1992 loan for $2,172 at 12 1/2% interest), T. 106, Defendant's Trial Exh.
12; First Security Bank (car loan), T.109; Utah Bank & Trust (1991 car loan), T. 110.
The evidence indicated that he was also extended credit by Phillips Petroleum,
Commercial Credit, Beneficial Finance, Metropolitan Finance Co. (1995), University
of Utah Credit Union (1992), Texaco (1991), and Norwest Credit (issuance of credit
card). T. 108-110. Moreover, in 1997, Ford Motor Credit financed Niculescu's
purchase of a new Ford Windstar Van. T. 110-111. By October 2000, Niculescu
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reported monthly earnings of $2,434 (equaling an annual income of $29,208) and his
wife $1,386 (equaling an annual income of $16,632). Defendant's Trial Exh. 15.
If Niculescu ever in fact borrowed money at 525% annual interest, there was no
documented proof of that evidenced at trial.
Niculescu's belief that CCC deliberately set out to destroy him and his business
by its report of repossession in 1987, a paranoia he reveals to this Court in his Brief,
likewise was not supported by the evidence at trial. Niculescu borrowed from CCC
$17,707.06 to purchase a van from Hinckley's. CCC in fact paid that very sum to
Hinckley's. T. 188-189. Niculescu repaid none of the money he had borrowed.
T.247. Instead, he unilaterally decided that he shouldn't have to repay it and returned
the van to the dealer with the message that he would not be making payments. CCC
took possession of the van as it was the collateral/security for Niculescu's obligation
to repay. CCC followed regular procedure in taking possession of the van, giving
notice, selling it at auction, and later reporting a repossession. T.193, 263. In a
Notice dated June 29, 1987, Defendant's Trial Exhibit 3, CCC advised Niculescu that
a deficiency of $6,036.07 remained after sale of the van and asked him to contact
CCC's Bountiful office, and offered to work with him in reestablishing his credit.
Niculescu did not respond. T.96, 254-256. Although CCC could have sued Niculescu
for the deficiency, it did not. T.96, 190, 255, 258.
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Niculescu never proved a motive why CCC's report of repossession or
voluntary surrender would be the product of malice. Niculescu knew no one in CCC's
Bountiful office or otherwise in its employment who had a grudge or vendetta against
him. T. 133-134. According to CCC's employees with knowledge of the Niculescu
account, the report of a repossession was not motivated by malice, ill will, hatred, or
an intent to injure Mr. Niculescu, T.190-191, 256-257; but was reported because it
was an accurate description of what happened, T. 191-193. In the fourteen years that
Jon Cassel worked at CCC's Bountiful office, he testified he knew of no instance
where a report of repossession was motivated by malice or an intent to injure. T.192.
Niculescu tells this Court that he wrote letters of protest concerning his
complaints about the van, which CCC did not heed. First, none of those letters were
in evidence and their content, thus, is unknown. Second, there was no evidence that
the "protest letter" to CCC was ever received, as Niculescu mailed it to a lock-box
payments-only address in California notwithstanding instructions in his payment book
that the California address was an address for receipt of payments only. T.83-84, 165167, 246, 253-254. As previously noted, he ignored CCC's invitation to contact it for
the purpose of addressing the deficiency and re-establishing credit. T.96, 255-256.
Although Niculescu tells this court that there were other ways in which CCC
could have handled and reported his credit performance, he does not explain
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how.9 CCC's representatives explained that its reporting was governed by uniform
procedures; that it reported performance on every loan and on every credit
performance event. T.192-193. Furthermore, it was not within CCC's prerogative to
forward borrowers' explanations or rationalizations as to why they chose not to repay
a loan. T. 177-178. Such explanations, however, can be presented by a borrower to
consumer reporting agencies. Niculescu might have conveyed to a consumer
reporting agency his belief that CCC's report of a repossession was inaccurate, which
would have required the agency to investigate his complaint. T.177; 15 U.S.C. §
1681i(a). But he did not. Niculescu might also have compelled the inclusion in any
subsequent credit report his explanation of his disagreement with CCC. 15 U.S.C.
§1681i(b). Paradoxically, Mr. Niculescu did neither of these things, despite his belief
that his refusal to repay his loan was legally justified, understandable, and excusable.
T.121.
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
I.

Chrysler Credit Corporation's liability is governed by 15 U.S.C.

9

Niculescu claims that CCC's Jon Cassell finally conceded that CCC could have
reported the repossession of collateral differently than it did. Brief at 10. This
conclusion, however, is not correct. Cassell was commenting (at R.217-218) on
the different ways that two credit bureaus had interpreted CCC's report of a
voluntary surrender of collateral: one, CBI, called it a "return of purchase";
another called it a "repossession." Even if there was more than one way for CCC
to have reported the repossession of collateral, it does not follow that the manner
in which CCC reported it was malicious and calculated to injure Mr. Niculescu.
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§1681h(e), a provision in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This section preempts state
common law claims for negligence. It also cloaks persons who report credit
performance information to a consumer reporting agency with a qualified immunity.
For CCC to in incur liability to Niculescu for its 1987 report of a repossession,
Niculescu must have proved that the report (1) was false AND (2) that it was
furnished with malice or a willful intent to injure him.
II.

Chrysler Credit Corporation's 1987 report of a repossession was not

false or inaccurate. Niculescu defaulted on his retail installment contract with CCC by
declaring that he intended not to repay his loan and, then, by failing to make the first
payment when it became due. Niculescu repaid none of the money he borrowed.
Niculescu gave CCC a security interest in the van he purchased in order to secure his
repayment obligations. On his default, CCC was legally entitled to repossess its
collateral and sell it. Its subsequent report of a repossession was factually and legally
correct.
III.

Appellant claims that he should have had the benefit of a more lenient

standard of proof, as a consequence of an amendment to federal law that he says
occurred after he filed his Complaint in 1989. First, this is an argument raised for the
first time on appeal; never presented to the Trial Court. Second, Niculescu does not
identify the alleged amendment, nor explains exactly how he thinks it should have
helped him. Third, CCC's liability in any event would be governed by the law as it
existed in 1987.
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IV.

The Trial Court's pretrial refusal to enter a default judgment was not

error, for the reasons summarized by Judge Anne Stirba in a Minute Entry dated May
19, 2000. On appeal, Niculescu changes the focus of his argument from alleged
dilatory tactics (which is what he emphasized to the Trial Court) to, almost
exclusively, a Rule 36 argument. His argument on Rule 36 warrants neither reversal
of the judgment or remand, as he contends. Niculescu's argument fails for several
reasons. First, the failure to timely respond to requests for admission does not, in any
event, warrant entry of a default judgment. Second, CCC's responses to Niculescu's
January 2000 Requests were timely as they were within the thirty allowed days plus
the extra three allowed for mailing. Third, Niculescu failed to include in his Requests
the mandatory cautionary language required by the second sentence of Rule 36(a)(1).
Finally, Niculescu never introduced as evidence at trial any of the "facts" that he now
claims on appeal should have been deemed admissions. Even now he does not
identify the "facts" that he contends were established by operation of Rule 36. Nor
does he explain how "facts" allegedly deemed so by Rule 36 clearly demonstrate that
the Court's Findings of Fact were erroneous, having first marshalled those facts in
support of the Findings.
V.

Appellant fails to marshall any of the evidence at trial that would

support the Trial Court's finding that CCC's reported repossession was not the
product of malice or an intent to injure Niculescu. Given Niculescu's failure to
marshall the evidence, he cannot establish on appeal that the Court's Findings were
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clearly erroneous; the standard of review dictated by Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P.
VI.

The Trial Court did not err in denying Niculescu's post-trial Motion for

Relief, by which he asked that the Court's Findings of Fact be amended pursuant to
Rule 60(b). His request to amend findings of fact came too late. A Rule 60(b) motion
cannot be used to circumvent the 10 day limitation contained in Rule 52(b) for seeking
amendment of findings.
VII.

Niculescu should not be heard to complain that the Trial Court erred by

failing to state in its findings of fact that CCC breached the 1992 Settlement
Agreement and by failing to identify and quantify damages caused by the breach.
When Niculescu (rightly or wrongly) became convinced in the mid 1990's that CCC
had not performed under the Settlement Agreement, he elected to rescind the
Settlement Agreement and revive the civil Complaint he filed in 1989. On
Niculescu's rescission of the Settlement Agreement, he forfeited any claim he had for
breach of that agreement.
VIII. The exhibit attached to Appellant's Brief as "C" has no relevance to any
issues on appeal.
ARGUMENT
Appellant in his Brief articulates four claims of alleged error. Brief at 11-18.
Before addressing Appellant's arguments, however, Appellee makes two points of its
own.
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First, liability for reporting to a consumer reporting agency is, and was in 1987,
governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). This federal statute preempts state law. It
provides qualified immunity to one who reports credit performance information to a
consumer reporting agency. It is the applicable law to which the Trial Court looked to
determine if CCC was liable to Mr. Niculescu given his allegations and proof. This
statute provides the legal context against which the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law must be examined.
Second, CCC contends that its 1987 report of a repossession was accurate and
correct. This is an important point because if the information it reported in 1987
concerning the status of Niculescu's loan was accurate, then there can be no claim by
Niculescu against CCC for reporting false information. If CCC's report was accurate,
the discussion of whether its reporting and conduct was negligent or malicious is
immaterial. This second point is also discussed below.
Once the preceding two points are addressed, CCC will address the four
claimed points of error in the order raised by Mr. Niculescu in his Brief. It will then
address two miscellaneous points at least implied by Niculescu's Brief.
I.

Federal Law Immunizes Persons who Report Credit Performance
Information to Consumer Reporting Agencies, Unless It is Proven
that the Reported Information was False AND was the Product of
Malice or a Willful Intent to Injure,

Once the Trial Court granted CCC leave to amend its Answer to assert a
Section 1681h(e) based affirmative defense, Niculescu thereafter conceded that his
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burden was (1) to prove that CCC's 1987 report of a repossession was false and (2)
that this false information was furnished with malice or willful intent to injure him.
See Niculescu's Trial Brief at R.851; Opening Argument at Trial, T.l 1.
Title 15 U.S.C. §1681h(e) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") provides
that:
"no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the reporting
of information against any consumer reporting agency, any user of
information, or any person who furnishes information to a consumer
reporting agency • . . except as to false information furnished with malice
or willful intent to injure such consumer," [Emphasis added].
Section 1681h(e) expressly protects persons who furnish credit performance
information to a consumer reporting agency.10 "No doubt the statutory immunity was
put in place to encourage entities to report credit information without fear of being
sued." Laracuente v. Laracuente. 599 A.2d 968, 971 (N.J. Super 1991). Thus, §
1681h(e) shields persons such as CCC who report credit information to consumer
reporting agencies unless it is proven that "false information" was reported and that
the false information was "furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such
consumer." Nikou v. INB National Bank, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 950 (Section
1681h(e) cloaks sources of information with qualified immunity); Laracuente, supra

FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency as any person who, for a fee,
regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Experion, Equifax, and TransUnion are examples of consumer
reporting agencies.
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(retail merchants who provide information to credit reporting agencies are immune
from suit under the Act where negligence is alleged absent any assertion of malice);
see also Mitchell v. Surety Acceptance Corporation, 838 F.Supp. 497, 501 (D.Colo.
1993) (holding that, "No defamation action is allowed under the FCRA unless it is
alleged that the defendant acted with malice or willful intent to injure the plaintiff).
This section of FCRA preempts state common law causes of action for negligence or
defamation unless malice or willful intent to injure is proven. Harper v. TRW. Inc.,
881 F.Supp. 294, 298 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Grant v. TRW, Inc.. 789 F.Supp. 690, 693
(D.Md. 1992); Laracuente. supra at 971.
The terms "malice" and "willful intent to injure," as used in § 1681h(e) are
defined terms under federal case law:
While the term "willful" is not defined under the FCRA, it has
been interpreted in this context as requiring a showing that
the agency " 'knowingly and intentionally committed an
act in conscious disregard for the rights of others."
Wiggins. 848 F.Supp. at 219 (citing Stevenson v. TRW. Inc.. 987
F.2d 288, 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1993)). Courts considering what
constitutes "malice" under this section have borrowed the
meaning of the term used in the context of libel litigation, see
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct.
710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964); in other words, an allegedly
defamatory statement will be deemed to have been made
with malice if the speaker knew it was false or acted with
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. See, e.g., Thornton
v. Equifax. Inc.. 619 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 835, 101 S.Ct. 108, 66 L.Ed. 2d 41 (1980); Wiggins. 848
F.Supp. at 223 & n. 17.
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Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 862 F.Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. N.Y.
1994) [emphases added].
The Trial Court Judge, however, adopted a definition of "malice" which he
disclosed was one of several he had found in sources he did not disclose. The
definition set forth by the Trial Court was:
Malice in law is not necessarily personal hate or ill will, but is
that state of mind which is reckless of law and the legal rights of
the citizens.
Transcript of Ruling, at 1. If anything, the Trial Court adopted as its definition of
"malice" an easier-to-meet standard than that embraced by federal courts interpreting
§ 1681h(e). The Trial Court, it appears, "set the bar" lower than it should have. Even
so, the Court found that Niculescu did not prove that CCC's report of a repossession
was the product of malice or a willful intent to injure him. Findings of Fact 20, 22,
24-26. R.866.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 1681h(e), Niculescu had to do more than prove that CCC
negligently reported incomplete or inaccurate information to a consumer reporting
agency. The statute preempts a claim by Niculescu under Utah common law, unless
he can prove that CCC reported false information and did so with malice or an intent
to injure him. Niculescu proved neither element.
II.

CCC's 1987 Report of a Repossession was Accurate.

When Niculescu sometime in April 1987 declared to Hinckley Dodge that he
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intended to repay none of the money he had borrowed to purchase the van, he effected
an anticipatory repudiation of his contract obligations to CCC and, thus, breached
them. See Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992). The breach was
confirmed on April 25, 1987 when he failed to make his first monthly payment, when
due. In fact, he made none of the sixty monthly payments that by contract he was
supposed to make.
Niculescu gave CCC a security interest in the van to secure his repayment
obligations. Finding of Fact 4c; Defendant's Trial Exh. No. 1. On his default, CCC
was entitled to take possession of the van (as it did about May 19, 1987) and after
appropriate notice sell it, with the proceeds to be credited against Niculescu's debt.
Findings of Fact 4c, 4g, 15-18, 26; Conclusions of Law 2-5. It was entitled to do so
by contract. See Defendant's Trial Exh. 1 at Section F. Likewise, repossession and
sale of collateral following a debtor's default is a statutory remedy to which a secured
creditor is entitled. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503 (secured party's right to take
possession of collateral after default) and §70A-9-504 (secured party's right to dispose
of collateral after default). Repossession, thus, was part of CCC's authorized remedy
on Niculescu's breach of contract.
It was not error for CCC to report a repossession, as the Trial Court concluded.
If the Court of Appeals agrees, this should end the analysis of whether liability exists
for false credit information reported by CCC.
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III.

Appellant's First Claim of Error Is Without Merit.

Appellant's first claim of error is particularly confusing as it is without
reference to the record. He states that:
at the time of ruling on the motion, the law [15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e)] had been
amended to allow claims for negligence. Since the Appellant's motion was
granted, and the Appellant's claims were of an ongoing nature . . . , he should
have been allowed the benefit of the new standard, at least as far as damages
occurring after the effective date of the amendment.
Brief at 11.
As a threshold matter, Appellant does not establish that the applicable Section
1681h(e) was ever amended in the time period between October 6, 1989 (the date he
filed his Complaint) and February 12-13, 2001 (date of trial).11 There is no citation to
any place in the record where Niculescu argued to the Court that he be "allowed the
benefit of [a] new standard," or what that "new standard" might be. To Appellee's
recollection, such an argument was never made to the Trial Court. Arguments not
made to a Trial Court generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991).
Second, it is not clear to what "motion" Appellant refers. As Appellant refers
to "Appellant's motion," CCC assumes that he is referring to the motion he filed in
August 1997 to set aside the earlier dismissal (R. 123-125). However, it is Niculescu

11

As a matter of fact, there was a 1996 amendment. That amendment added
language not relevant to this analysis. It most certainly did not authorize lawsuits
for merely negligent reporting of false credit information.
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who elected to revive the deficient complaint he filed in 1989. Nonetheless, he could
have thereafter moved to amend his Complaint to make it comport with "amended"
statutory law, if there was any reason to do so. However, he did not.
The lens through which this case focused on 15 U.S.C. f 1681h(e) was CCC's
motion for leave to amend its Answer. R.454-468. The motion, which was granted
(R.524-526), sought leave to add as an affirmative defense the qualified immunity
established by §1681h(e). Although Niculescu opposed the motion to amend, R.503505, he did not do so on the grounds now stated in his Brief at 11.
At no time, either before trial or at trial, did Niculescu ever argue that there was
some alternative and more lenient standard to which he should be held, established by
statutory amendment. Even had there been an amendment, the law in effect in 1987
when CCC reported a repossession is the law that would govern its potential liability.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) (quoting
Okland Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)).
IV.

The Trial Court's Pre-Trial Refusal to Sanction Chrysler Credit
Corporation and Enter a Default Was Not Error.

Throughout the pretrial phase, Niculescu sought to have the Trial Court default
CCC for what he perceived to be discovery abuses. A chronology of his efforts in this
regard are succinctly summarized by the Court (Hon. Anne M. Stirba) in a Minute
Entry (May 19, 2000) at R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto).
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The Minute Entry explains why Niculescu's complaints were misguided and
why his requests for sanctions not well founded. R.518-520; see also Order Denying
Niculescu's "Motion for Sanctions and to Enter Default" at R. 528-530. According to
the Court, CCC timely complied with its Order to Compel entered on September 29,
1999 and timely responded to Niculescu's requests for admission and other discovery
served in January 2000.
Niculescu's pretrial request for sanctions was made to the Trial Court by
Motion/ Memorandum dated March 22, 2000. R.365-400.12 CCC's opposition
memorandum is found at R. 401-450 and Niculescu's Reply at 471-502. The relief
Niculescu sought was entry of a default judgment, "based upon the total lack of good
faith handling of this matter by the defendant" and conduct that he thought "willful
and wanton" which demonstrated "willfulness, bad faith or fault or persistent dilatory
tactics frustrating the judicial process." R.368. The Trial Court disagreed with
Niculescu's contentions and for the reasons articulated in its Minute Entry denied his
motion. R.518 (Exhibit "C" hereto).
On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of his
insufficiency, "bad faith" and "dilatory tactics" arguments. Instead, he now focuses
exclusively on requests for admission, Rule 36, and cases interpreting Rule 36 to

12

There was a prior, contested, motion to compel filed November 9, 1999. R.249.
However, as noted by the Court's May 19, 2001 Minute Entry, Niculescu never
noticed this motion up for decision. R.518.
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argue that the Court should have deemed his requests admitted, which "would have
conclusively established many, if not all the facts necessary for the appellant to
prevail." Brief at 14. Then he comes back to his argument that sanctions should have
been imposed . . . and concludes that, "the Court clearly erred in denying the motion
for sanctions." CCC responds as follows:
First, a failure to timely respond to requests for admission (assuming that to
be true) does not under Rule 36 warrant entry of a default judgment. The effect of a
failure to timely respond within the time allowed is that the requests are deemed
admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a). That is all. "Deemed admissions" are thus an effect
of not responding in a timely fashion. A party should have the option and right to
ignore requests for admission if, for example, the requests are not contested, or are
innocuous and immaterial. Had CCC flat out ignored requests for admission, that
would not by itself establish cause for entry of a default judgment.
Second, CCC timely responded to Niculescu's January 27, 2000 Requests for
Admission. Niculescu complains that his requests for admission:
. . . served on January 27, 2000, were not responded to
until at least February 28, some 32 days later . . . "
Niculescu thus concludes that as CCC's responses appeared on the 32nd day, they
therefore were past the 30 day due date prescribed by Rule 36(a)(1) and, thus, dire
consequences should follow. Part of the problem is that Niculescu does not
understand how the 30 day response date is calculated. Niculescu certified his
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Requests for Admission as served by mail on January 27, 2000. R. 359. CCC
responded February 28, 2000. See Certificate of Service at R.363 and CCC's
responses at R.403, 418-421 (Exhibit "B" hereto). Rule 36(a)(1) gave CCC thirty
days in which to respond to Niculescu's requests. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e) gave it an
additional three days, as Niculescu's requests were served by mail. CCC therefore
had until February 29, 2000 to respond. Its response on February 28, 2000 was thus
one day early! Consequently, the Requests for Admission cannot be deemed admitted
by passage of time. See_ Minute Entry, R.518, 519 ("Chrysler Financial timely
responded to plaintiffs second motion to compel and plaintiffs January Requests for
Admission").
Third, Niculescu did not include his requests for admission the mandatory and
cautionary notice required by the second sentence of Rule 36(a)(1). The failure to
include in his requests this sentence, mandatory since 1986, should mean that requests
will not be deemed admitted even if the response is untimely. See also Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 36.
Finally, even assuming that any of Niculescu's requests for admission should
be deemed admitted, Niculescu never at any time offered them as proof: at trial (see
Plaintiffs Trial Brief at R. 949); in opposition to CCC's pretrial motion for summary
judgment, R. 713-721; 13 or in support of his own motion for partial summary

13

CCC's motion is found at R. 576. Memoranda and supporting papers are found
at R. 556 - 575, 579 - 671. CCC's motion was denied. R. 735 - 740.
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judgment, R.142. Even if any of Niculescu's requests were to be deemed admitted,
that did not relieve him of the necessity of introducing them as evidence.

Massey v.

Haupt. 632 P.2d 824, 825-825 (Utah 1981)14. A trial court cannot be faulted for its
failure to consider "deemed admissions" in deducing findings of fact or in arriving at a
judgment if an appellant did not put them into evidence. IcL at 826.
Not only can a trial judge not be expected to take into account
discovery material never adverted to, but, additionally, the party
against which it is to be used has no opportunity to test its
evidentiary competence, to illuminate its significance.. .
*

*

*

Discovery material on file but not called to the attention of the
trial judge enjoys no better standing on appellate review than a
motion filed but never presented, or evidence in possession or
control of a party which was not introduced, [citations omitted].
In principle, attempting to argue the significance of material not
before the court below is the same as arguing on appeal a point of
law not raised before the trial judge.
S. Kemble Fischer Realtv Trust v. Board of Appeals of Concord. 402 N.E.2d 100, 102
(Mass. App. 1980) (referring to admissions generated by requests for admission).
Even now, Appellant only vaguely asserts his opinion that there "were material facts
that, if deemed admitted, would have conclusively established many, if not all of the
facts necessary for the appellant to prevail." Brief at 14 (emphasis added). Appellant
does not identify these "facts." Nor does he attempt to explain how these deemed
"facts" would clearly negate the factual findings that the Trial Court made after receipt

l4

See also cases from other jurisdictions cited at Triple I Supply v. Sunset Rail 652
P.2d 1298, 1300 n.5 (Utah 1982).
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of evidence, when the evidence is marshalled in support of the findings that were
made. In any event, his complaint of error is ill-founded where he never gave the trial
court an opportunity to base its judgment on "facts" that he believes (rightly or
wrongly) had been established via requests for admission. Bair v. Axiom Design,
LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 395 (Utah 2001).
V.

There Exist No Grounds on which to Overrule the Trial Court's
Findings on Malice/Intent to Injure.

The Trial Court entered Findings of Fact opposed to Niculescu's theory of the
case. R.862-870 (Exhibit "A" hereto). Findings of Fact relevant to Niculescu's claim
of malice include the following:

22.

Chrysler Credit's report of a voluntary surrender was not the
product of malice or ill will.

24.

There is no evidence that Chrysler Credit reported a voluntary
surrender or repossession with an intent to harm Plaintiff.

25.

Chrysler Credit Corporation did not report erroneous credit
information with an intention to harm Mr. Niculescu or his credit.

26.

Chrysler Credit followed normal and regular procedure in
obtaining possession of the van following Plaintiffs default,
giving Plaintiff notice of sale, and in notifying him of the
deficiency that remained after sale of the van.

Whether a person has acted with malice is, as Niculescu notes, a question of
fact. See, Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App.), cert.
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denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). On the basis of the evidence before it, the Trial
Court found that CCC's report of a repossession was not the product of malice, or an
intention to harm Niculescu.
According to Rule 52(a), Findings of Fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous." Cornish Town v. Roller. 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988).
An appellant who wishes to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of
fact must marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial that supports the Court's
findings, Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in
the light most favorable to the trial court, it is insufficient to support the challenged
finding. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); Harker v.
Condominiums Forest Glen. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah App. 1987). To establish clear
error, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'..." In re Bartell. 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989). This burden "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that [courts
of appeal] do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed facts." Id. at 886. When an
appellant fails to carry his burden of marshaling the evidence, courts of appeal should
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as
valid." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 153 (Utah
App. 1989).
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Appellant makes no effort to marshal that evidence which would support the
Court's Findings. All he does is repeat the generalized story and argument he made at
trial and identify in a general sense, only, those "facts" that he says "are relevant in
interpreting whether the respondent acted with malice, as defined by statute." Brief at
17. An appellant who makes no effort to marshal facts in support of a court's finding
cannot carry his burden on appeal to prove the finding is clearly erroneous. The
analysis on appeal need not proceed past this point. West Valley City v. Majestic
Development Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App.1991); Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, supra at 553.
As noted supra at 26, the Trial Court adopted a less stringent standard of proof
required to prove malice under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) than that established by federal
case law. Even though the Court perhaps set the bar lower than it should have,
Niculescu still could not clear it. He could not prove that CCC's conduct was
malicious. The Court's finding that there was no malice exhibited by CCC is not
clearly erroneous.
VI.

The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Relief from Judgment and Objections to the Form of the Judgment.

At the conclusion of trial, the Judge handed to CCC's counsel his edited copy
of CCC's pretrial proposed Findings and directed that they be revised. Transcript of
Hearing at 8; R.839-847 (shows Judge's edits). CCC's counsel did so and served
Niculescu with proposed Findings of Fact by mail, on February 15, 2001. R.871. Per
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Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code Judic. Admin., any objections to the form of the Order
should have been made no later than February 23, 2001 (allowing an extra three days
for service by mail). Thirteen days after the last day for objections had passed, on
March 8th, Niculescu finally objected to the proposed Findings. Three days after
that, on March 11th, the Court signed and entered Findings of Fact. R.862. The
Judgment was later entered March 28, 2001. R.883.
Niculescu thereafter sought to amend the Court's Findings of Fact, by way of a
"Motion for Relief" filed April 24, 2001 (R.886); twenty-seven days after the
judgment had been entered. However, he waited too long, as a motion to amend
findings of fact must be filed within ten days after entry of judgment. Utah R.Civ.P.
52(b); Bonneville Billing & Collection v. Torres. 15 P.3d 112, 114 (Utah App. 2000).
Niculescu tried to evade the 10-day limitation by claiming his motion was brought
pursuant to Rule 60(b). R 886. But in order for Rule 60(b) to warrant relief, the
movant must show that there exists one or more of the reasons enumerated by Rule
60(b) for avoiding or amending the judgment or order. Richins v. Delbert Chipman &
Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). Niculescu failed to identify any basis
under Rule 60(b) that would warrant the relief the relief he requested. On that ground,
also, his motion was correctly denied. Minute Entry (May 29, 2001) at R. 909; see
also Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs "Motion for Relief," R.
894-897. Furthermore, a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used to extend the 10 days
under Rule 52(b) in which to move for amendment of findings of fact. In re Bundv's
Estate, 241 P.2d 462 (Utah 1952).
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VII.

The issue of CCC's Performance Under the 1992 Settlement
Agreement Became Irrelevant and Immaterial Once Niculescu
Elected to Rescind it and Revive his Original 1989 Complaint

Niculescu's principal post judgment complaint with regard to the foregoing
Findings was that they omitted any reference to the 1992 settlement agreement and
damages caused by CCC's alleged breach of that agreement. Indeed, Appellant's
Brief continues his tirade regarding the settlement agreement. As the Trial Court
concluded, CCC's alleged nonperformance of the settlement agreement is immaterial
given Niculescu's election to rescind the settlement agreement and revive his original
Complaint. Transcript of Ruling at 4. Furthermore, the Exhibit (Plaintiff's Trial Exh.
30) on which Niculescu bases this implied point of error was not received in evidence.
R.856.
Niculescu's motion to set aside the earlier dismissal and to reopen the case
concluded that "plaitif[sic] is entitled to an Order, setting aside the settlement
and judgment of dismissal.. . upon plaintiff tendering into court the consideration of
$1,500 which he received in compromise settlement. . . "R. 123-124 [emphasis
added]. Niculescu voluntarily disgorged the $1,500 settlement proceeds he had
received.15 R.124. The resulting Order set aside the earlier settlement agreement and

15

Niculescu voluntarily tendered and paid into Court the $1,500 he had received in
1992, so that he could rescind the settlement agreement and reopen the case.
However, when CCC later tried to claim the $1,500, Niculescu tried to prevent it s
release. See R.531-551, 687-689, 693-699. The Court released the money to
CCC, concluding that Niculescu's election of remedy and his repudiation of the
1992 settlement agreement required its disgorgement and its return to CCC.
R.735-739, 748-751.
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Order of Dismissal, per his request.
An executory accord is a type of settlement agreement whereby a party accepts
future performance by the other as consideration or partial consideration for his
release of claims. Stratton v. West States Construction, 440 P.2d 117 (Utah 1968).
When an executory accord is breached (or alleged to have been breached), the nonbreaching party has two choices: he may elect to recover damages for breach of the
new obligation or he may elect to sue on the old one. Stratton. supra at 118.
However, the non-breaching party must elect which of the two alternative remedies he
wishes to pursue. He cannot have both. "A party to a settlement agreement cannot,
on the other party's failure to perform, proceed on the original obligation and retain
the benefit of the settling agreement." 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement §46
(1967).
For better or for worse, Niculescu in 1997 elected to proceed on his original
action. In so doing, he repudiated the 1992 settlement agreement. Having done so, he
cannot now claim that the Trial Court should have awarded him damages for CCC's
alleged breach of the settlement agreement. Nor should he be allowed to assert, as he
does, that [alleged] breach of a repudiated settlement agreement establishes evidence
of malice in connection with a report of repossession submitted half a decade earlier.
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VIII. Appellant's Exhibit "C" to his Brief is not Part of the Record on
Appeal.
Exhibit C to Appellant's Brief is not part of the Record. It was not introduced
into evidence, nor did Niculescu try to introduce it into evidence. Furthermore, it
purports to comment on prior practices of Chrysler Motor Corporation, which is a
different company than was Chrysler Credit Corporation. It is not clear why Exhibit
C is appended to Niculescu's Brief. In any event, it is of no relevance to the issues
raised on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Appellee asks that the Court of Appeals affirm the Judgment of the Trial
Court and dismiss the appeal.
DATED this $A

day of January, 2002.
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

YIAJ

By:

ih—•

P.Bryan Fishburn, Esq., Attorneys for
Appellee Chrysler Financial Company,
L.L.C., successor-in-interest to Chrysler
Credit Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLEE was mailed, postage prepaid, on this
y day of January, 2002, to the
following:
Mark Besendorfer, Esq. / ^ /
942 East 7145 South, #A-102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Gary R. Howe, Esq.
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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EXHIBIT "A"
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552)
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300

e/_

Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89090611£?£^
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER
CREDIT CORPORATION,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

* * * * * * *

FINDINGS OF FACT
Having received the evidence presented at trial, the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact:

1.

On or about March 11, 1987, Plaintiff purchased a 1987 Dodge B150 Van

from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City.
2.

Plaintiff did not have thefinancialability to pay the purchase price in cash

and thus borrowed the purchase price from Chrysler Credit Corporation.
3.

Chrysler Credit Corporation's financing of Plaintiffs purchase is

documented by a Retail Installment Contract dated March 11, 1987.
4.

The Retail Installment Contract provides, among other things, that:
a.

Chrysler Credit financed $17,706.06 of Plaintiffs purchase (i.e., it
loaned him that amount).

b.

Plaintiffs total payments over the course of his loan were to be
$24,861.60, which he agreed to pay back over 5 years at $414.36 a
month.

c.

Plaintiff gave the lender a security interest in the van (left-hand
column, about one-third down from top of page; also Section A in
lower left-hand corner).

d.

Plaintiff promised to repay the lender the amount it had financed
according to the installment schedule stated in the contract. (Section
A, lower left-corner).

e.

Plaintiff acknowledged that the Retail Installment Contract was to be
assigned to Chrysler Credit.

f.

Plaintiff would be in default of his obligations under the contract if
he failed to make payments as scheduled.

g.

In the event of Plaintiffs default, Chrysler Credit would have the
right to repossess its collateral (Page 2 Section F) and apply the
proceeds of its sale to reduce the amount of Plaintiffs debt (Page 2
Section G).
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h.
5.

Plaintiff signed the Agreement and thus, agreed to its terms.

Although the Retail Installment Contract proclaimed the vehicle would be

for personal and not commercial use, the Defendant knew the vehicle was to be used as a
taxi. The dealer's employees were the Defendant's agent in improperly filling out the
contract.
6.

Plaintiff knew when he purchased the van that it would be used for

commercial purposes, as a taxi. He did not intend it to be for personal use. However, the
Defendant also knew that Plaintiff intended to use the van as a taxi after purchase.
7.

On purchasing the van, Plaintiff immediately put it to commercial use as a

taxi and made such alterations (including painting it red) necessary to adapt it to taxi
services.
8.

Plaintiff says he experienced significant mechanical problems shortly after

he purchased the van, although he did not prove it. He did not give Chrysler Motor
Company a reasonable time to correct the alleged problems.
9.

With regard to the alleged problems concerning the van, Plaintiff sued

Chrysler Motor Company, but not Chrysler Credit Corporation, in United States District
Court in September 1987. Specifically, this prior action alleged breach of warranty,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and negligent manufacture. No findings of
fact were made in the Federal Court action, and there was no adjudication of the claims
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therein raised because the lawsuit was settled and dismissed on payment to Plaintiff by
Chrysler Motor Company of a modest sum certain.
10.

Plaintiffs United States District Court Complaint did not pray that

Plaintiffs purchase be rescinded or set aside, or that he be relieved of his obligation to pay
for the van, but instead sought damages of $250,000.
11.

Plaintiff made none of the monthly payments due Chrysler Credit under the

Retail Installment Contract.
12.

Plaintiff repaid none of the $24,861.60 that the Retail Installment Contract

obligated him to repay over time.
13.

About March 31 or April 1, 1987, after his purchase, Plaintiff returned the

van to Hinckley and left it there.
14.

At the same time he returned the van to Hinckley, Plaintiff says he wrote

Chrysler Credit Corporation and told it why he was giving back the van and why he
intended to not make payments. However, the Pasadena post office address to which
Plaintiff allegedly mailed his letter was a lock box intended only for the receipt of
payments; not customer complaints.
15.

Chrysler Credit obtained possession of the van from Hinckley Dodge.

16.

Chrysler Credit notified Plaintiff that it was in possession of his van and

intended to sell it at on or after May 29, 1987.
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17.

Chrysler Credit received no response from Plaintiff to the aforementioned

18.

On June 29, 1987, Chrysler Credit wrote Plaintiff and provided him with an

notice.

accounting following sale of his van. The letter reported a deficiency/balance due of
$6,036.07. The letter invited Plaintiff to contact Chrysler Credit and work with it to reestablish his credit.
19.

Plaintiff did not respond to Chrysler Credit's June 29, 1987 letter.

20-

In the normal course of its business, Chrysler Credit reported to a consumer

reporting agency a "voluntary surrender."
21.

Chrysler Credit did not sue Plaintiff for the deficiency he still owed after the

sale of his van.
22.

Chrysler Credit's report of a voluntary surrender was not the product of

malice or ill will.
23.

The report of a "voluntary surrender" is functionally the same as a

"repossession." There is little distinction between the two in terms of evaluating consumer
credit.
24.

There is no evidence that Chrysler Credit reported a voluntary surrender or

repossession with an intent to harm Plaintiff.
25.

Chrysler Credit Corporation did not report erroneous credit information with

an intention to harm Mr. Niculescu or his credit.
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26.

Chrysler Credit followed normal and regular procedure in obtaining

possession of the van following Plaintiffs default, giving Plaintiff notice of sale, and in
notifying him of the deficiency that remained after sale of the van.
27.

About October, 1987, Plaintiff obtained a copy of his credit report. It

showed that Chrysler Credit had reported a repossession.
28.

Plaintiff has not proved that the damages he claims were caused by Chrysler

Credit's 1987 report of a "repossession."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court enters the following conclusions of law:
1.

The Retail Installment Contract that Plaintiff signed on March 11, 1987 was

a valid contract.
2.

Plaintiff breached his legal obligation under the Retail Installment Contract

he signed in March 1987.

He had failed to make the first monthly payment due under the

contract and said he would not make payments.
3.

Plaintiffs post purchase return of the van to Hinckley Dodge, coupled with

his failure to make satisfactory arrangements with Chrysler Credit regarding his installment
debt and loan constituted an anticipatory repudiation by plaintiff of his obligations under
the Retail Installment Contract.
4.

On Plaintiffs breach, Chrysler Credit was entitled by the terms of its

contract and by the law, Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503, to take possession of its collateral.
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5.

Having taken possession of its collateral on the Plaintiffs breach of

contract, Chrysler Credit had a contractual right to sell the collateral and apply the net sale
proceeds to his debt. See also Id. §70A-9-504 (secured party's right to dispose of collateral
after default).
6.

Chrysler Credit's 1987 report to a consumer reporting agency was accurate.

It was not "false," as Plaintiff claims. A voluntary surrender is a repossession.
7.

In order for Plaintiff to establish a cause of action for damages based on an

allegedly erroneous credit report filed by Chrysler Credit Corporation, Plaintiff must prove
by a preponderance of evidence that Chrysler Credit furnished erroneous information "with
malice or willful intent to injure" the Plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. §1681h(e); Mitchell v. Surety
Acceptance Corp.. 833 F.Supp. 497, 501 (D. Colo. 1993); Grant v. TRW. Inc.. 789
F.Supp. 690, 693 (D. Md. 1992); Laracuente v. Laracuente> 599 A.2d 968, 971
(N.J.Super. 1991).
8.

Chrysler Credit's report of a repossession was not motivated or produced by

malice or a wilful intent to injure Plaintiff.
9.

Chrysler Credit, on purchase of the Retail Installment Sale contract from

Hinckley Dodge became a holder-in-due course. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-305.
10.

As a holder-in-due course, Chrysler Credit's rights under the Retail

Installment Contract were and are not affected by defenses or claims that might have been
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asserted against Chrysler Motor Company or Hinckley Dodge based on the condition of the
vehicle. Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-305.
11.

Plaintiff has not proved that the damages he claims were caused by Chrysler

Credit's 1987 report of a repossession.
12.

Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. On learning that Chrysler Credit

had reported a repossession, Plaintiff had the right under federal law to explain his position
to any credit reporting agency and insist that his written explanation of up to 100 words be
included in any subsequent credit reports. 15 U.S.C. §1681i(b) & (c). Plaintiff did not, in
the fourteen years since 1987, ever exercise this right Mto set the record straight." He
never availed himself of the opportunity to explain to future creditors why he had not
repaid his obligation to Chrysler Credit.
13.

Plaintiffs alleged letters were not reasonably calculated to reach anyone at

Chrysler Credit involved in handling customer complaints.
14.

Chrysler Financial Company, as the successor-in-interest to Chrysler Credit

Corp., is not liable to Plaintiff on the third cause of action pleaded by Plaintiff in his
Complaint or on what remains of his first cause of action.
15.

Defendant is not entitled to recover attorneys fees from Plaintiff. Plaintiffs

cause of action is not founded on the contract; thus there exists no contractual right to
recover attorneys fees.
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16.

The Court does not find that Plaintiffs pursuit of this action was "not in

good faith." Defendant therefore has not established a right to recover attorneys fees under
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.

DATED this

day of.

A/,

/

., 2001.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Byj ^^y'
J u 9 g e i ^ £ Cornaby

9
»

pbf\30846M
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the following FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, on this
of February, 2001, to the following:

Mark Besendorfer, Esq.
942 East 7145 South, #A-102
Midvale, Utah 84047

pbA308461-l
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EXHIBIT "B"
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
February 28, 2001
Certificate of Service
CCC's Response to Requests for Admission

:,

• i

i

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * *

if

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiff,

0

j , vs.

II

Civil No. 89090611CV

! HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
!! corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
!; CORPORATION and CHRYSLER
' CREDIT CORPORATION,

Judge Anne M. Stirba

!i
J I

I!

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

• i

This is to certify that on the

szIk

'day of February, 2000, RESPONSES TO

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, together with this CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE, were mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Mr. Adrian Niculescu
470 South 1300 East, #309
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

DATED this "^

day of February, 2000.

CALLKTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

B y.

**r>P. Bryan Fishbum, Esq., Attorneys for Defendant
Chrysler Credit Corporation

pbf\276969-l
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
GARY R. HOWE, ESQ. (#A1552)
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572)
Gateway Tower East, Suite #900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801)530-7300
Attorneys for Defendant Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., successor-in-interest to
Defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
!
Plaintiff,
vs.
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER
CREDIT CORPORATION,

CHRYSLER FINANCIAL
COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION
?

Civil No. 890906110CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

* * * * * * *

I
j

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 1: Admit that after the transaction which

I is the subject matter of this action was completed, you, or agents on your behalf,
reported a negative credit transaction, to-wit, that the vehicle was reported as
| repossessed and the loan was listed as a defaulted loan.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Denied. Chrysler
!

(

Credit, however, reported a repossession.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2; Admit that no independent verification

! was made by you as to the reason for the alleged default on the loan in question and
' alleged repossession of the vehicle.
|

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Denied. Chrysler

i

; Credit reported a repossession because the loan was in default, which it verified.
|
i

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3: Admit that on or about March 31,

j 1987, you received written communication from the Plaintiff that the debt was disputed

ji
' and/or the vehicle had been returned voluntarily because it was defective.
!«

||

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3: Denied for the

i[

, reason stated by Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, dated 10-08-99.
i

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 4: Admit that you did not report the debt
i

!

|i

as disputed after receiving the above notice.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Denied for the

reason stated by Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, dated 10-08-99. It also
would not have been Defendant's obligation to report the debt as disputed.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that after the original settlement
in this matter in 1992 which provided for, among other things, an agreement on your
part to correct the credit history, no action was taken by you to correct the credit
history and you continued to report the loan as a default and that the vehicle had been
repossessed.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that even after being served
with this lawsuit in 1989, and even after the settlement in 1992, no action was taken by
you to correct the credit history or report the debt as disputed.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that the Plaintiff demanded that
you comply with the terms of the settlement agreement several times since the
agreement was entered into by way of personal and written communications with your
counsel.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Defendant admits
that the letter attached to Plaintiff's Requests was received by Chrysler Credit's
attorney, Gary R. Howe.

-3-

DATED this

*7$

day of February, 2000.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

IQ^JujJ.^

P. Bryan fishbum, Esq., Attorneys for Chrysler
Financial Company, L.L.C.

pbf\268487-l
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EXHIBIT "C"
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
Court's Conclusion that CCC's
February 28, 2001-Certificate of Service
Response to Discovery Timely

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 890906110CV

vs.

Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER CREDIT
CORPORATION,

Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
May 19, 2000

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Rule 4-501
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Specifically, on March 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a "Motion for
Sanctions and to Enter Default." On March 30, 2000, defendant,
Chrysler Financial Company, as a successor-in-interest to Chrysler
Credit Corporation, filed their "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Sanctions and to Enter Default." On April 12, 2000, plaintiff
filed its "Reply Regarding Motion for Sanctions and to Enter
Default." The matter was submitted for decision on April 13, 2000.
Neither party requested oral argument.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda and for the
good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling.
With this motion, plaintiff seeks an order of this Court
deeming admitted plaintiff's requests for admission, striking
Chrysler Financial's Answer and entering default against Chrysler
Financial. Plaintiff bases this request upon what he alleges is
Chrysler Financial's continual failure to respond to discovery.
Chrysler Financial opposes the motion arguing it has timely
responded to the orders of this Court, as well as subsequent
discovery requests served by plaintiff.
Accordingly, Chrysler
Financial has done nothing to warrant sanctions or an entry of
default.

NICULESCU v. HINCKLEY DODGE

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

This action was filed in 1989. In 1992, the parties entered
into a settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, the
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice in 1992. In 1997, plaintiff
filed a motion to reopen the case, which was granted by this Court.
On September 27, 1999, this Court entered a Minute Entry
directing defendants to respond to plaintiff's previously filed
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests
for Admission, on or before October 8, 1999. According to the
record, Chrysler Financial's response was dated and served October
8, 1999.
On November 8, 1999, plaintiff filed a Second Motion to
Compel, asserting Chrysler Financial's October 8 response was not
complete.
Chrysler Financial opposed the motion by memorandum
dated November 18, 1999, and supported by the Affidavit of Garry R.
Howe. This motion was never submitted for decision and during this
time, plaintiff's attorney withdrew from the case.
On January, 27, 2000, plaintiff served defendant, by mail, a
second set of Requests for Admission.
Defendant served its
response on February 28, 2000.
Based upon the forgoing, it appears Chrysler Financial
complied with the Court's Order to respond to previously filed
discovery by October 8, 1999. Moreover, Chrysler Financial timely
responded to plaintiff's second motion to compel1 and plaintiff's
January Requests for Admission.
Although plaintiff contends
Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories are unresponsive, he does
not specifically identify which answers are unresponsive or why he
believes they are lacking. Finally, although Chrysler Financial
admits not producing many documents in response to plaintiff's
recent discovery request, according to the uncontorverted affidavit
of Gary R. Howe, everything Chrysler Financial has to produce has
been produced.
Based upon the forgoing, there is no conduct on the part of
Chrysler Financial that would warrant the granting of sanctions or
the entry of default against Chrysler Financial.
Accordingly,
plaintiff's motion is respectfully, denied.

1

As noted, this motion was never submitted for decision.

NICULESCU v. HINCKLEY DODGE

DATED this
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day of May, 2000.
BY THE COURT

ANNE M. STIRI
STIRB
DISTRICT COURT

MINUTE ENTRY

EXHIBIT "D"
Niculescu v. Chrysler Credit Corp.
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) Fair Credit Reporting Act
(qualified immunity)

Ch. «

CONSUMER CREDIT

, r e s to consumer completely re~'~] °A nature and substance of derogato'
alters in its report, was not estab^ • d by record indicating that agency
" ^ t at every step to block consumer in
A t t e m p t to secure rights given to him
":> this subchapter and that agency not
" \ delayed and misled consumer on
-Lion of his first request, but even did
V
"on a second and third occasion. Mill* n, v O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., C.A.8
X ) 1976, 528 F.2d 829.
Failure of consumer reporting agency
•o disclose nature and substance of all
.nformation contained in its files concrnmg consumer who sought such information, agency's forcing consumer to reurn to its offices on several occasions
and attempting to withhold from consumer information that was rightfully due
mm under this subchapter warranted imposition of liabilities for violation of this
Action. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports,
Inc. E.D.Mo.1974, 383 F.Supp. 269, affirmed 528 F.2d 829.

§ 1681 h.

15 § 1681h
Since this section requiring consumer
reporting agency to disclose information
to consumer is designed to protect consumer, any request for information by a
consumer concerning his file should require agency to report each of the three
items of disclosure listed in this section.
Equifax Services, Inc. v. Lamb, Ky.App.
1981, 621 S.W.2d 28, certiorari denied
102 S.Ct. 1973, 456 U.S. 927, 72 L.Ed.2d
442.
Consumer reporting agency complied
with disclosure requirements under this
section for consumer reports where all of
the reports were disclosed to consumer,
consumer was given copies of two of the
reports and discovery taken during suit
revealed no additional information which
had not already been disclosed in a timely fashion prior to the action being
brought Equifax Services, Inc. v. Lamb,
Ky.App.1981, 621 S.W.2d 28, certiorari
denied 102 S.Ct 1973, 456 U.S. 927, 72
L.Ed.2d 442.

Conditions and form of disclosure to consumers

(a) In general
(1) Proper identification.—A consumer reporting agency shall require, as a condition of making the disclosures required under
section 1681g of this tide, that the consumer furnish proper identification.
(2) Disclosure in writing.—Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the disclosures required to be made under section
le>81(g) of this title shall be provided under that section in writing.
(b) Other forms of disclosure
(1) In general.—If authorized by a consumer, a consumer reporting agency may make the disclosures required under 1681g of this
title-—

(A) other than in writing; and
(B) in such form as may be—
(i) specified by the consumer in accordance with paragraph (2); and
(ii) available from the agency.
(2) Form.—A consumer may specify pursuant to paragraph (1)
l
*at disclosures under section 1681g of this tide shall be made—
(A) in person, upon the appearance of the consumer at the
place of business of the consumer reporting agency where disclo113

15 §1681h

COMMERCE AND TRADE

Ch.

sures are regularly provided, during normal business hours, and
on reasonable notice;
(B) by telephone, if the consumer has made a written request
for disclosure by telephone;
(C) by electronic means, if available from the agency; or
(D) by any other reasonable means that is available from the
agency.
(c) Trained personnel
Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel to
explain to the consumer any information furnished to him pursuant
to section 1681g of this title.
(d) Persons accompanying consumer
The consumer shall be permitted to be accompanied by one other
person of his choosing, who shall furnish reasonable identification.
A consumer reporting agency may require the consumer to furnish a
written statement granting permission to the consumer reporting
agency to discuss the consumer's file in such person's presence,
(e) Limitation of liability
Except as provided in sections 168In and I68I0 of this title, no
consumer mav bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence wi{h respect to ifo
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant
to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer
against whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in
part on the report except as to false information furnished with
malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.
(Pub.L. 90-321, Title VI, § 610, as added Pub.L. 91-508, Tide VI, § 601, Oct
26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1131, and amended Pub.L. 104-208, Div. A, Tide II,
§ 2408(e)(1), (e)(4), (e)(5)(B), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-438, 3009-439.)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1968 Acts. House Report No. 1040 and
Conference Report No. 1397, see 1968
U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p.
1962.
1970 Acts. House Report No. 91-975
and Conference Report No. 91-1587, see
1970 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p.
4394.

Amendments
1996 Amendments. Section heading.
Pub.L. 104-208, Div. A, Title II.
§ 2408(e)(5)(B), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat
3009-439, inserted "and form" following
"conditions".
Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub.L. 104-208, Div.
A. Tide II, § 2408(e)(1), Sept. 30, 1996,
110 Stat. 3009-438, revised subsecs. (a)
and (b).
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